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INTRODUCTION
The current foreclosure crisis has devastated many predominantly black
or Hispanic communities, in part because blacks and Hispanics were disproportionately likely to finance their home purchases or refinance existing
mortgages with subprime mortgages, which enter foreclosure at far higher
rates than prime mortgages. Across the nation, blacks were almost three
times more likely to receive a subprime first lien home purchase mortgage
than whites, and Hispanics were 2.6 times more likely than whites to receive such loans. There are a variety of explanations for these stark racial
disparities in subprime lending, ranging from underlying income and
wealth inequalities between whites, blacks, and Hispanics to intentional
discrimination in lending practices.
Efforts to determine which of these explanations are most apt and to
craft appropriate policy responses to the racial disparities in the share of
subprime mortgages should take into account the relationship between existing levels of residential segregation and the racial disparities in the types
of mortgages homeowners received. Residential segregation may make
discrimination more likely by providing easy geographic markers for the
targeted racial groups, for example. Residential segregation may also exacerbate the exclusion of blacks and Hispanics from more competitive financial markets and from other consumers who are more sophisticated
about mortgage products. Understanding the relationship between segregation and racial disparities in subprime lending may thus help elucidate the
causes of those disparities. Similarly, understanding the relationship may
help policy-makers develop better solutions to the racial disparities in the
mortgage market. If levels of segregation are highly correlated with racial
disparities in lending, policy-makers may need to devote more resources to
ensuring that minority communities are not targeted by subprime lenders or
deserted by prime lenders. If levels of black-white segregation are more
highly correlated with racial disparities in lending patterns than levels of
Hispanic-white segregation, policy-makers may need to fine-tune programs
to take into account differences between highly segregated black and Hispanic communities.
This Article explores the relationship between residential segregation in
about 200 metropolitan areas across the country and the propensity of borrowers within those areas to receive subprime loans. It also examines how
borrowers of all races who live in highly segregated minority neighborhoods fare in the mortgage market, compared to those who live in more
heterogeneous communities.
Part I reports the stark racial disparities in the percentage of subprime
mortgages received by members of different racial groups. Part II explores
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the various mechanisms that might explain those racial disparities, and assesses whether and how a higher level of segregation in a metropolitan area
might magnify them. Part III reviews what we know—and do not know—
from earlier studies about the relationships between subprime lending and
neighborhood segregation. Part IV describes our study methodology and
reports our findings.
I. RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME LENDING
Prior research on the mortgage market has found persistent racial disparities in the incidence of subprime and high-cost lending.1 Across the
United States, larger shares of black and Hispanic borrowers originated
high-cost loans in 2006 relative to white borrowers2 (see panel A of Table
13).4 That year, 53.3% of first lien home purchase loans issued to black
borrowers were high-cost, and 46.2% of first lien home purchase loans issued to Hispanic borrowers were high-cost, compared to only 17.7% of
loans issued to white borrowers.5 The rates of high-cost refinance loans
1. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL BURDEN: INCOME AND
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME LENDING IN AMERICA (2000), available at
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/unequal_full.pdf; see also Robert B. Avery et al.,
The 2007 HMDA Data, 95 FED. RES. BULL. A107 (2008).
2. Our calculations use mortgage loan data reported by lenders under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (“HMDA”) and made available by the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council. Although 2007 HMDA data is now available, because of the turmoil
in the real estate markets and mortgage lending industry beginning in 2007, several institutions that originated loans that year did not survive long enough to report their lending activity. Therefore for our national analysis, we use HMDA data for loans issued in 2006, which
we believe represents the most recent complete set of single-year mortgage lending data.
3. In Table 1, the percentages presented in the columns represent the percentage of the
population in that column that has the characteristics described by the row heading.
4. Throughout this Article, we use “high-cost” as a measure of subprime lending. We
classify first lien loans as high-cost if they have an interest rate more than three percentage
points higher than the federal treasury rate of similar maturity. For junior lien loans (included in our refinance loan observations), the threshold is five percentage points. This
commonly used definition of subprime lending is more dependable than other measures,
such as identifying loans made by subprime lenders (using the HUD Subprime Lender list),
for two main reasons. First, the high-cost classification identifies subprime loans based on
loan characteristics instead of lender characteristics. Second, the latest Subprime Lender list
was released in 2005, making it a less accurate strategy for identifying subprime lenders in
2006 and 2007. See KRISTOPHER GERARDI ET AL., BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY, MAKING SENSE OF THE SUBPRIME CRISIS (2008) (discussing the benefits and
drawbacks to these measures); Avery et al., supra note 1; see also FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL
ESTATE & URBAN POLICY, DECLINING CREDIT AND GROWING DISPARITIES: KEY FINDINGS
FROM HMDA 2007 (2008).
5. In this Article, we analyze home purchase loans and refinance loans separately because their origination patterns are often tied to different macroeconomic contexts and borrower motivations. For home purchase loans, we look only at first lien loans to avoid the
inherent double counting of borrowers that results from including junior lien home purchase
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follow a similar pattern: over half of refinance loans issued to black borrowers in 2006 were high-cost, compared to over a third of refinance loans
issued to Hispanic borrowers, and only a quarter of those issued to white
borrowers.6
Although the rates of high-cost lending in the mid-2000s were lower in
New York City than for the nation as a whole for all racial groups, in New
York the racial disparities remained wide (see panel B of Table 1). Pooling
New York City loan origination data from 2004–2007,7 we find that less
than 8% of the first lien home purchase loans issued to white borrowers
were high-cost, compared to over 40% of the loans issued to black borrowers, and over 30% of the loans issued to Hispanic borrowers. The shares of
high-cost refinance loans issued to blacks and Hispanics (37.3% and
30.1%, respectively) were approximately twice as large as the high-cost
share issued to whites (17.5%).
II. CAUSES OF RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME LENDING AND THE
ROLE OF SEGREGATION
There are several possible explanations for the wide disparity in subprime or high-cost lending rates between white borrowers, on the one hand,
and black and Hispanic borrowers on the other. These include underlying
economic inequality between borrowers of different races, cultural or geographic differences between the various racial groups that lead them to rely
on different sources for mortgages, and racial discrimination in mortgage
marketing and underwriting. This Part describes these explanations in
more detail, and addresses how the extent of segregation in a metropolitan
area might affect each of these possible underlying causes.
A.

Underlying Economic Inequality

The mortgage underwriting process is primarily an evaluation of the risk
that a mortgage loan applicant will default on a proposed loan and, if there
is ultimately a foreclosure, that the collateral securing the loan will be inloans (which by definition are issued to borrowers simultaneously receiving a first lien
home purchase loan).
6. The disparities in high-cost lending between whites and blacks and whites and Hispanics highlighted at the national level persist across the nine census regions, although the
magnitudes of the disparities differ.
7. 2004–2007 are the most recent years for which data are available for New York City
and also are the years over the last decade in which the highest number of home purchase
loans were originated in New York City. The highest share of the home purchase loans
originated were subprime. AMY ARMSTRONG ET AL., FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE &
URBAN POLICY, STATE OF NEW YORK CITY’S HOUSING AND NEIGHBORHOODS 2007, at 7-9
(2008).
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sufficient for the lender to recoup the resulting loss. While lenders differ in
how they make these underwriting calculations,8 the industry generally relies primarily on the following measures to make this risk evaluation: the
applicant’s credit history;9 the ratio of the loan principal to the home value
(“LTV”) that would result from the proposed loan;10 the ratio of the proposed mortgage payments (as well as required property tax payments, insurance payments, and, sometimes, other household debt payments) to the
applicant’s income (the debt-to-income ratio, “DTI”); the applicant’s liquid
assets (beyond the down payment); and the type of documentation the applicant provides to substantiate the applicant’s reported income and asset
base.11
A borrower with a lower credit score, higher LTV, higher DTI, lower asset base, lower amount of documentation, or a combination of these factors
represents a greater presumed risk of default or foreclosure. In theory,
lenders demand a higher rate of interest or higher origination fees to compensate for the additional risk posed by borrowers with these traits, or insist
upon mortgage insurance or some other credit enhancement device to mitigate the additional risk. This trade-off is a key element of what is known
as “risk-based mortgage pricing.”12 Although scholars contest the extent to

8. Despite the large number of institutions that originate loans, the underwriting of
much of the mortgage market is largely standardized as a result of the dominance of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac in the secondary markets for prime loans. Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac make their proprietary automated underwriting systems available to originating lenders.
9. While an applicant’s credit history is collapsed for many purposes into a single numeric score by Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO Score), Fannie Mae’s automated underwriting
system reviews the applicant’s actual credit history for specific characteristics. See Lew
Sichelman, Fannie Mae Introduces Desktop Underwriter 5.0, REALTY TIMES, July 19, 2000,
available at http://realtytimes.com/rtpages/20000719_fmunderwriter.htm.
10. Since January 15, 2008, Fannie Mae has set lower LTV limits for loans to be issued
in geographic areas that Fannie Mae considers to be “declining markets,” in effect adding a
geographic criterion to the underwriting process. MARIANNE E. SULLIVAN, FANNIE MAE,
ANNOUNCEMENT 7-22 AMENDS THESE GUIDES: SELLING MAXIMUM FINANCING IN DECLINING
MARKETS (2007), available at http://www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/annltrs/pdf/2007/
0722.pdf.
11. For a general description of underwriting criteria, see Anand K. Bhattacharya et al.,
An Overview of Mortgages and the Mortgage Market, in THE HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGEBACKED SECURITIES 3, 17-20 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., 6th ed. 2006) (1995).
12. Risk-based pricing also describes the manner in which a lender balances a borrower’s strengths in some underwriting measures against the borrower’s weaknesses in others. Lenders may also seek additional fees or higher interest rates to compensate for noncredit-based risks, including the risk of borrower prepayment and risks to the lender’s reputation arising from making subprime loans. See id. at 24-26; see also J. Michael Collins et
al., Exploring the Welfare Effects of Risk-Based Pricing in the Mortgage Market, in
BUILDING ASSETS, BUILDING CREDIT: CREATING WEALTH IN LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES
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which economically efficient risk-based pricing explains the growth of
subprime lending over the last several years,13 there is a notable correlation
between underwriting criteria and the interest rate an applicant receives, or
whether or not the applicant receives a “subprime” loan (the precise definition of which varies across the studies).14
For multiple reasons, risk-based pricing is likely to cause disparate
shares of whites, blacks, and Hispanics to receive subprime loans, given the
persistent economic inequality between racial groups in the United States.
First, income is a major component of DTI; in 2006 (the year the mortgages we analyze were originated), the median income for white households was 62% higher than that of black households, and 35% higher than
that of Hispanic households.15 Second, household wealth is an indicator
(albeit an imprecise one) of both liquid assets and a borrower’s ability to
make a down payment, which is a primary determinant of LTV. Racial
disparities in household wealth are even starker than those for income.16
Finally, blacks and Hispanics are disproportionately more likely than
whites to have lower credit scores or no credit score at all.17 Underlying
economic inequality is thus one important reason that racial groups have
different likelihoods of receiving subprime loans.

138, 138-140 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2005) (providing thorough descriptions and discussions of risk-based mortgage pricing).
13. Alan White, for example, presents an alternative “opportunity-pricing” hypothesis in
which subprime mortgage terms are not highly correlated with additional risk, but are instead the result of racial price discrimination and marketing, issues discussed later in this
section. See Alan M. White, Risk-Based Mortgage Pricing: Present and Future Research,
15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 503, 504-06 (2004); see also Howard Lax et al., Subprime
Lending: An Investigation of Economic Efficiency, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 533 (2004).
14. See, e.g., Debbie Gruenstein Bocian et al., Race, Ethnicity and Subprime Home
Loan Pricing, 60 J. ECON. & BUS. 110, 117-21 (2008); Marsha J. Courchane, The Pricing of
Home Mortgage Loans to Minority Borrowers: How Much of the APR Differential Can We
Explain?, 29 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 399 (2007); Michael LaCour-Little, The Home Purchase Mortgage Preferences of Low- and Moderate-Income Households, 35 REAL EST.
ECON. 265, 286-87 (2007).
15. The percentages reported are based on the median income for households with nonHispanic white householders, black or African-American householders, and Hispanic or Latino householders (who could be of any race), as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2006
American Community Survey.
16. In 2004, for example, the median wealth of white families was more than five times
that of non-white and Hispanic families. See Brian K. Bucks et al., Recent Changes in U.S.
Family Finances: Evidence from the 2001 and 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, 92 FED.
RES. BULL. A1, A8 (2006).
17. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON CREDIT
SCORING AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY OF CREDIT 150-55
(2007); TEX. DEP’T OF INS., REPORT TO THE 79TH LEGISLATURE, USE OF CREDIT
INFORMATION BY INSURERS IN TEXAS 13-15 (2004).
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Geographic Differences and Borrower Behavior

In addition to economic inequalities between racial and ethnic groups,
several other differences between minority and white borrowers might also
contribute to differential rates of subprime borrowing. First, mortgage
channels—the institutional chains through which mortgages are funded—
have a significant impact on the types of loans issued.18 Thus, if racial
groups use different mortgage channels, they are likely to end up with different rates of high-cost borrowing. White and minority borrowers have
tended to access capital markets for home lending through different channels, with white borrowers more likely than black and Hispanic borrowers
to take out loans from depository institutions, and black and Hispanic borrowers more likely than white borrowers to rely on largely unregulated
mortgage banks.19 An analysis of 2006 mortgage data highlighted the effect that a loan’s source is likely to have on its subprime status by showing
that controlling for the identity of the lender reduced most of the racial disparities in high-cost lending rates that year.20
Differences in racial groups’ use of the various mortgage channels are
no doubt at least partly a result of underlying economic inequality.21 Some
researchers hypothesize that these differences also might result from the
relative scarcity of prime lenders in poor minority neighborhoods, which
forces residents of those areas to rely on unregulated mortgage banks.22
This hypothesis is supported by somewhat dated empirical evidence suggesting that bank branch locations in minority areas do in fact increase
lending levels by that bank23 and that minority neighborhoods are relatively
underserved by bank branches.24 However, all racial groups have come to
rely less on mortgage lending by banks with proximate physical branches.
In 2004, only 28.5% of mortgages issued to whites were issued by CRA-

18. WILLIAM APGAR ET AL., JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV.,
MORTGAGE CHANNELS AND FAIR LENDING: AN ANALYSIS OF HMDA DATA (2007), available
at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/mm07-2_mortgage_market_channels.
pdf.
19. Id. at 27.
20. Robert B. Avery et al., The 2006 HMDA Data, 93 FED. RES. BULL. A73, A95
(2007).
21. Individual mortgage lenders have historically specialized in prime or subprime
loans, and in 2006, there was still a significant concentration of high-cost lending among a
relatively small number of lenders. Id. at A88.
22. See APGAR ET AL., supra note 18, at 30.
23. Angela E. Chang, Role of Bank Branch Locations in Minority Lending (Vassar Coll.
Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 41, 1998).
24. See David N. Figlio & Joseph W. Genshlea, Bank Consolidations and Minority
Neighborhoods, 45 J. URB. ECON. 474 (1999).
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regulated25 banks that had a branch in the borrower’s metropolitan area,26
which suggests that unequal proximity to lenders is unlikely to explain
much of the racial disparities in loan outcomes.
Consumer advocates also have emphasized the increased role that brokers played in mortgage origination during the subprime lending boom, and
the possible incentives brokers had to steer borrowers to high-priced products.27 In theory, if using a broker to obtain a mortgage is linked to the
probability of receiving a high-cost loan, racially disproportionate use of
brokers (as a result of community relationships and social networks, for example) could contribute to racial disparities in high-cost lending. However,
while brokers unquestionably played an outsized role in the subprime boom
(brokers were involved in 71% of subprime loan originations, but only 50%
of total loan originations in 200528), the empirical evidence that broker usage resulted in high-cost loans is mixed.29
Finally, to the extent that racial groups have different levels of financial
sophistication, or different access to information about the types of loans
available, such differences may result in different rates of subprime borrowing. A number of studies matching borrower survey data to loan outcomes reveal that subprime borrowers are generally less financially sophisticated than prime borrowers, shop around for loans less than prime

25. The Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”), which covers most depository institutions, encourages covered lenders to extend loans to traditionally underserved communities
in metropolitan areas in which the lender maintains physical branches. See APGAR ET AL.,
supra note 18.
26. Id. at 27.
27. See, e.g., REN S. ESSENE & WILLIAM APGAR, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF
HARVARD UNIV., UNDERSTANDING MORTGAGE MARKET BEHAVIOR: CREATING GOOD
MORTGAGE OPTIONS FOR ALL AMERICANS 7 (2007); KELLIE KIM-SUNG & SHARON
HERMANSON, AARP RESEARCH REPORT, EXPERIENCES OF OLDER REFINANCE MORTGAGE
LOAN BORROWERS: BROKER- AND LENDER-ORIGINATED LOANS (2003), available at
http://www.aarp.org/research/credit-debt/mortgages/experiences_of_older_refinance_
mortgage_loan_borro.html
28. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS’N, MBA RESEARCH DATA NOTES, RESIDENTIAL
MORTGAGE ORIGINATION CHANNELS 1 (2006).
29. See Amany El Anshasy et al., The Pricing of Subprime Mortgages by Mortgage
Brokers and Lenders (Credit Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 70, 2006) (concluding that
subprime borrowers who used brokers obtained cheaper loans than subprime borrowers who
did not use brokers); Michael LaCour-Little, The Pricing of Mortgages by Brokers: An
Agency Problem? (Cal. State Univ. at Fullerton, Working Paper, 2008) (finding that broker
usage for prime loans did lead to higher borrower costs); see also Courchane, supra note 14,
at 430 (finding that obtaining a loan through the wholesale channel (e.g., broker use) increased the probability of receiving a subprime loan and, in one of two years studied, a
higher APR); LaCour-Little, supra note 14, at 287 (finding that the only observable impact
of broker involvement was a correlation between minority borrowers and increased use of
loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration).
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borrowers, or have a less accurate estimate of their credit score than prime
borrowers.30 These findings suggest yet another mechanism that could
contribute to racial disparities in high-cost lending: differences across racial
groups in shopping behavior and financial accuity. Some data support this
possibility. In survey results reported by the American Association of Retired Persons (“AARP”), for example, black respondents were significantly
more likely than white respondents to list reviewing telephone and mail advertising and considering recommendations from a contractor as steps they
take to find a home equity lender, and less likely than white respondents to
list an inquiry at a bank, savings and loan institution, or credit union.31
Hispanic respondents were more likely to list consulting their mortgage
broker or current lender than white respondents, but listed an inquiry at a
bank, savings and loan institution, or credit union as frequently as white respondents.32 Other observers have posited that incorrect estimations by
some high-credit blacks of their credit-worthiness has skewed the pool of
black loan applicants towards the less credit-worthy, contributing to racially prejudiced misconceptions held by lenders about the creditworthiness
of all blacks.33
C.

Racial Discrimination, Steering, and Targeting

The final broad category of explanations for racial disparities in subprime borrowing is lender behavior that is motivated, or at least informed,
by the loan applicant’s race. The country’s unfortunate legacy of excluding
blacks, Hispanics, and other racial and ethnic minorities from housing and
mortgage markets has prompted a rich literature examining lingering racial
discrimination in these areas.34 Two types of racial discrimination could
contribute to the racial disparity in subprime outcomes: discriminatory underwriting and discriminatory targeting of potential loan applicants.
30. See, e.g., Marsha Courchane et al., Consumer Credit Literacy: What Price Perception?, 60 J. ECON. & BUS. 125 (2008); Marsha Courchane et al., Subprime Borrowers:
Mortgage Transitions and Outcomes, 29 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 365, 381 (2004); Lax et
al., supra note 13, at 569.
31. AARP, 2003 CONSUMER EXPERIENCE SURVEY: INSIGHT ON CONSUMER CREDIT
BEHAVIOR, FRAUD AND FINANCIAL PLANNING fig.20 (2003).
32. Id.
33. See ESSENE & APGAR, supra note 27, at 23. But see Vanessa Gail Perry, Is Ignorance Bliss? Consumer Accuracy in Judgments About Credit Ratings, 42 J. CONSUMER AFF.
189, 201 (2008) (finding that those who overestimate their credit ratings are more likely to
be black or Hispanic).
34. For a review of this literature, see Gary A. Dymski, Discrimination in the Credit and
Housing Markets: Findings and Challenges, (Univ. of Cal., Riverside Dep’t of Econ.,
Working Paper No. 02-18, 2002), available at http://www.economics.ucr.edu/papers/papers
02/02-18.pdf.
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Historically it has been difficult to use statistics to prove racial discrimination in underwriting because of a lack of publicly available data about
borrowers’ credit-worthiness. Using privately collected data, however,
several researchers have attempted to isolate the significance of an applicant’s race in underwriting decisions. Several studies since 199635 find
that, even controlling for underwriting criteria (including applicant-level
credit history), there is a racial gap in the probability of receiving a subprime loan or higher interest rate.36 Most of the research, however, stops
short of concluding that these results are evidence of actual racial discrimination.
An alternative method of investigating racial discrimination in lending
outcomes is the auditing undertaken by the Federal Reserve, the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, and the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development (“HUD”). Such in-depth reviews of actual loan files
and underwriting processes have revealed some signs of biased behavior on
the part of lenders.37
A second form of racial discrimination is targeting, or “reverse redlining,” in which lenders or mortgage brokers, presuming a lack of financial
sophistication, aggressively market loans to blacks or Hispanics, or to particular neighborhoods.38 As a result of this targeting, and the high pressure
or even deceptive sales tactics lenders or mortgage brokers may employ,
some minority households who were not otherwise seeking mortgage loans
will enter the subprime market, and some homeowners or potential homebuyers with strong underwriting profiles who could have qualified for
prime loans will instead use subprime products. To date, little empirical
research has demonstrated the distinct role of targeting in racial disparities
of mortgage outcomes, but researchers have observed that geographic patterns of lending are consistent with this mechanism.39

35. Alicia H. Munnell et al., Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA Data,
86 AM. ECON. REV. 25 (1996). For a description of the ensuing debate, see Stephen L. Ross,
The Continuing Practice and Impact of Discrimination (Univ. of Conn. Dep’t of
Econ.,Working Paper No. 19, 2005).
36. See, e.g., Bocian et al., supra note 14; McKinley Blackburn et al., A Comparison of
Unexplained Racial Disparities in Bank-Level and Market-Level Models of Mortgage Lending, 29 J. FIN. SERVICES RESOURCES 125 (2006); Courchane, supra note 14. But see LaCour-Little supra note 14, at 287 (finding that race is not statistically significant in determining subprime outcomes).
37. For a review of audit studies, see Dymski, supra note 34, at 17.
38. For a review of legal issues surrounding racial targeting, see Benjamin Howell, Exploiting Race and Space: Concentrated Subprime Lending as Housing Discrimination, 94
CAL. L. REV. 101 (2006).
39. As part of an in-depth study of targeting in New Jersey, Newman and Wyly concluded that the geographic lending patterns they find are “what would be expected on the
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The Role of Segregation

Metropolitan-level segregation could intensify some of the potential
causes of racial inequalities in subprime lending described above.40 Specifically, as outlined below, segregation may exacerbate underlying economic inequality, contribute to differences in financial sophistication,
shopping behavior, and mortgage channel use, and provide increased opportunities for high-cost lenders and mortgage brokers to target potential
borrowers.
Several observers have described the ways in which residential segregation can reinforce economic inequality between whites and minorities (particularly blacks). The spatial mismatch theory, for example, argues that
segregation separates racial minorities from access to jobs.41 Segregation
can lead to the social isolation of racial minorities, preventing youth from
learning from good role models, and limiting the ability of residents to
benefit from networks that could help them find jobs or otherwise improve
their lives.42 Segregation can also lead to a concentration of poverty in certain neighborhoods.43
Several studies have examined the impact of segregation on economic
performance and found that segregation exacerbates economic outcomes
for blacks living in segregated communities.44 Research on segregation
and the concentration of poverty demonstrates that there may also be a
multiplier effect when segregation interacts with poverty. High levels of
segregation can create pockets of dense poverty within urban areas, magnifying the vulnerability of community members to the effects of an eco-

basis of the economic rationality of targeting,” but they were unable to establish causation
with their data and analysis. See Kathe Newman & Elvin K. Wyly, Geographies of Mortgage Market Segmentation: The Case of Essex County, New Jersey, 19 HOUSING STUD. 53,
78 (2004).
40. “Metropolitan-level segregation” refers to the degree of racial or ethnic segregation
measured at the level of the metropolitan statistical area.
41. As introduced by John Kain in 1968, “spatial mismatch” is the idea that segregation
separates communities from access to jobs because these communities are often spatially
separate from employment centers. John F. Kain, Housing Segregation, Negro Unemployment, and Metropolitan Decentralization, 82 Q. J. ECON. 175 (1968).
42. Katherine M. O’Regan & John M. Quigley, Teenage Employment and the Spatial
Isolation of Minority and Poverty Households, 31 J. HUM. RESOURCES 692 (1996).
43. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND
THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1998).
44. See, e.g., David M. Cutler & Edward L. Glaeser, Are Ghettos Good or Bad?, 112 Q.
J. ECON. 827 (1997); O’Regan & Quigley, supra note 42. Similar to the theories described
above, Cutler and Glaeser note that there are different pathways by which segregation can
lead to negative outcomes for minorities, such as limiting contact with educated people and
increasing commute times.
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nomic shock.45 Because economic inequality plays a significant role in
creating racial disparities in high-cost lending, to the extent segregation intensifies underlying inequality, it also could magnify differential rates of
high-cost loan origination.
Segregation also influences racial disparities in access to information
and community networks in many ways.46 By increasing the social isolation of racial minorities, high levels of segregation may limit their exposure
to financial literacy information, including beneficial loan shopping strategies, and may lead black and Hispanic borrowers to rely on local mortgage
brokers rather than lower cost but more distant bank branches or internetbased brokers. Given patterns of bank branch location, higher levels of racial segregation might also result in increased racial disparities in geographic proximity to traditional prime lending institutions. To the extent
that differences in proximity to traditional prime banking channels contribute to disparities in the rate of subprime borrowing, segregation may exacerbate those disparities.
Finally, the geographic concentration of racial minorities resulting from
higher levels of segregation could make residents of these communities
more vulnerable to racial targeting by subprime lenders or to systematic,
racially-motivated avoidance (i.e., “redlining”) by prime lenders. To the
extent prime lenders still market by neighborhood geography, high levels
of high-cost lending resulting from targeting or from past redlining could
“crowd out” better lending products that might otherwise be marketed there
by willing prime lenders.47
III. PRIOR INVESTIGATIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
SEGREGATION AND SUBPRIME LENDING
The proliferation of subprime lending over the last decade has led a
handful of researchers to look at the relationship between subprime lending
and segregation. A 2005 report by the National Community Reinvestment
Coalition (“NCRC”) looked across 177 metropolitan statistical areas

45. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 43.
46. See generally INGRID GOULD ELLEN, IS SEGREGATION BAD FOR YOUR HEALTH? THE
CASE OF LOW BIRTH WEIGHT, BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URBAN AFFAIRS (2000).
47. The National Community Reinvestment Coalition Report posits: “When subprime
lending crowds out prime lending in traditionally underserved communities, price discrimination and other predatory and deceptive practices become more likely as residents face
fewer product choices.” NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., FAIR LENDING DISPARITIES BY
RACE, INCOME AND GENDER IN ALL METROPOLITAN AREAS IN AMERICA 3 (2005) [hereinafter
NCRC REPORT].
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(“MSAs”)48 and found, among other things, that in 2003, black borrowers
in MSAs with higher black-white segregation tended to have higher ratios
of subprime to prime lending.49 While there was no significant analogous
interaction between Hispanic-white segregation and lending to Hispanics,
the study found that Hispanic borrowers in MSAs with higher percentage
of Hispanic residents tended to enjoy lower ratios of subprime to prime
loans.50 The study also found that for borrowers living in minority tracts
(regardless of their individual race), higher MSA-level black-white segregation was associated with higher MSA-level ratios of subprime to prime
lending.51
Professors Carolyn Bond and Richard Williams assessed whether increased access to lending for blacks fostered or hindered black-white integration in a study published in 2007.52 Their analysis examined changes in
lending and segregation patterns between 1990–2000 across MSAs and
found that greater lending to blacks increased their homeownership and
black-white integration in general.53 The authors also found that traditional
lending increased integration (although the effect was small), but other
forms of loans (government insured or subprime) did not.54
Finally, a forthcoming paper looks at the relationship between subprime
lending and segregation, theorizing that segregation may cause residents to
be less financially sophisticated and therefore more vulnerable to targeting
by subprime lenders, and that prime lenders may avoid low income and
minority neighborhoods in highly segregated areas, leaving residents more
likely to have to resort to subprime loans.55 Using regression analysis, the
authors find that MSA-level segregation has a significant impact on the

48. The U.S. Office of Management and Budget defines a metropolitan statistical area as
a:
Core Based Statistical Area associated with at least one urbanized area that has a
population of at least 50,000. The Metropolitan Statistical Area comprises the central county or counties containing the core, plus adjacent outlying counties having
a high degree of social and economic integration with the central county as measured through commuting.
Standards for Defining Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,227, 82,238 (Dec. 27, 2000).
49. NCRC REPORT, supra note 47, at 13.
50. Id. at 15.
51. Id. at 16.
52. Carolyn Bond & Richard Williams, Residential Segregation and the Transformation
of Home Mortgage Lending, 86 SOC. FORCES 671 (2007).
53. Id. at 691.
54. Id. at 692.
55. GREGORY D. SQUIRES ET AL., FED. RESERVE SYS. CMTY. AFFAIRS RESEARCH
CONFERENCE, SEGREGATION AND THE SUBPRIME CRISIS (forthcoming 2009).
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proportion of subprime loans issued in an MSA and that “concentration of
minorities is just as important as the number of minorities in predicting
subprime loans.” Indeed, the study finds that “a 1% increase in segregation
is associated with a .014% increase in the proportion of subprime lending.”56
Those studies begin to illuminate the relationship between residential
segregation and subprime lending, but they focus on the aggregate share of
subprime lending in a community. This Article builds on these previous
studies by focusing instead on individual borrowers, investigating the relationship between a metropolitan area’s racial segregation and the probability that individual members of different racial groups will receive high-cost
loans. Higher levels of residential segregation could be associated with a
greater overall subprime share for the metropolitan area, yet affect the rate
of subprime mortgages issued to blacks differently than the rate to Hispanics. Further, it is hard to predict, based upon the explanations discussed
earlier, how levels of segregation are likely to affect the probability that
whites receive subprime loans. This study therefore tries to disentangle the
effects that segregation may have on subprime lending by assessing the relationship between MSA-level segregation indices and the probability that
individual borrowers of different races will receive a high-cost loan, controlling for the borrowers’ characteristics. We divide MSAs into different
quartiles based on levels of black-white or Hispanic-non-Hispanic white
segregation, to address the possibility that relationships between segregation and high-cost lending may be non-linear. We also assess the relationship between segregation and subprime first lien home purchase loans
separately from the relationship between segregation and subprime refinancing loans, because the mechanisms by which segregation affects subprime lending may differ according to the type of loan at issue. Finally, we
complement our national analysis of MSAs across the country with a more
focused analysis of lending in neighborhoods within New York City. That
analysis assesses whether borrowers of all races who live in neighborhoods
with high concentrations of either blacks or Hispanics are more likely to
receive subprime loans than borrowers living in more heterogeneous
neighborhoods.

56. Id. at 17.
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IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A.
1.

Methodology

Metropolitan Area Segregation and Lending

As discussed above, nationwide, black and Hispanic borrowers are more
likely than non-Hispanic white57 borrowers to receive high-cost loans. Our
key question is whether these disparities are larger in more segregated areas. We explore whether minority borrowers are more likely to receive a
high-cost loan if they live in more racially segregated metropolitan areas
and, using the case of New York City, whether minority borrowers are
more likely to receive a high-cost loan if they live in neighborhoods with
larger proportions of minority residents. In the first part of the analysis, we
look across metropolitan areas to reveal whether residential segregation by
race or ethnicity is related to the likelihood of minority borrowers within
those large metropolitan areas receiving high-cost loans. Because this
analysis only observes racial composition and segregation at the MSAlevel, however, it might obscure more intricate relationships between the
demographics of a neighborhood and the likelihood of its residents of each
race or ethnicity to obtain a high-cost loan. Accordingly, the second part of
the analysis focuses on New York City and looks across neighborhoods to
determine whether the racial or ethnic composition by neighborhood (i.e.,
census tract) is associated with disparities in lending outcomes for individual borrowers of different races and ethnicities.
Our national analysis tests whether the difference in the likelihood that
minority and white borrowers get high-cost loans is greater in more segregated metropolitan areas. Specifically, we estimate the following logistic
regressions:
Log [Pi/(1-Pi)] = X’β + Z’γ + BSEG’µ + BSEG*BLACK’η
Log [Pi/(1-Pi)] = X’β + Z’γ + HSEG’µ + HSEG*HISP’η
Pi is the probability that borrower i receives a high-cost loan, X represents the matrix of individual-level variables, including a set of income
variables, race, gender, whether there is a co-applicant on the loan, and the

57. Throughout this Article, our use of the term “white” refers to non-Hispanic whites.
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loan amount.58 Z represents the matrix of metropolitan area-level variables,
including median income, population, proportion minority, and a set of
dummy variables indicating which of nine census regions contains the metropolitan area. BSEG and HSEG represent a set of dummy variables representing the level of black-white segregation and Hispanic-non-Hispanic
white segregation levels respectively in the metropolitan area (explained
more fully below). BLACK and HISP are dummy variables taking on the
value of one if the borrower is black or Hispanic, respectively. We are
most interested in the coefficient µ, which measures the association between segregation and the likelihood of getting a high-cost loans for white
borrowers, and the coefficient η, which measures the differential association between segregation and high-cost lending for blacks or Hispanics
relative to whites. The first regression is estimated for black and white borrowers; the second regression is estimated for Hispanic and white borrowers. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering within a metropolitan area.
There are multiple approaches to measuring racial segregation. We
choose to use the most standard measure of segregation, the dissimilarity
index. The dissimilarity index captures the extent to which two groups (in
this case, blacks and whites or Hispanics and whites) are distributed differently across neighborhoods within a metropolitan area. Although this index is imperfect,59 it has been used extensively and can be conveniently interpreted as the share of minority residents that would have to move from
one neighborhood—here proxied by a census tract—to another within a
metropolitan area in order for minority and white residents to have the
identical distributions. Thus, when there is no segregation, the index is
zero, and with complete segregation, it equals one. We also estimated our
regressions using the isolation index, a measure of exposure that captures
the extent to which people live in census tracts with other people of their
same race. The isolation index for blacks, for instance, is equivalent to the
percentage of blacks living in the neighborhood of the typical black person
in an MSA. The results were largely the same using both indices, therefore
only the results with the dissimilarity index are shown.

58. Because they are not available through HMDA or any other public source, our
analysis does not include individual-level credit scores.
59. See David R. James & Karl E. Taeuber, Measures of Segregation, 15 SOC.
METHODOLOGY 1 (1985); Sean F. Reardon & Glenn Firebaugh, Measures of Multigroup
Segregation, 32 SOC. METHODOLOGY 33 (2002). The dissimilarity index is a measure of the
evenness of the population—how evenly members of a racial group are distributed throughout the broader population—however, it does not describe the spatial proximity of members
of a racial group to one another. Other measures such as the isolation index or the relative
clustering index provide information about the spatial dimensions of segregation. The literature on segregation measures provides criteria for comparing and testing each index.
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Whatever the measure used, we do not expect segregation to have a simple linear relationship with lending patterns. Thus, rather than simply including the value of the segregation index, we divide our metropolitan areas into quartiles of segregation levels and test whether borrowers are more
likely to get high-cost loans when they live in a metropolitan area with
low/moderate, moderate/high, or high levels of segregation as compared to
a borrower living in a metropolitan area with low levels of segregation.
In addition to estimating separate regressions testing for an association
between racial segregation and high-cost lending for black and Hispanic
borrowers, we also undertake separate analyses for borrowers getting first
lien home purchase loans and those getting refinance loans. As noted
above, it is possible that the effects of racial composition and segregation
differ for first lien home purchase borrowers and those getting refinance
loans. We therefore estimate separate regressions for borrowers seeking
different types of loans.
In both sets of analyses, we focus on the individual borrower and model
his or her probability of getting a high-cost loan. By controlling for the individual characteristics of borrowers, we can test whether a household is
more likely to get a high-cost loan than a household with identical, observable attributes if it resides in a more segregated metropolitan area.
In the national analysis of black segregation, we include all black and
white borrowers in metropolitan areas in which at least 200 loans were
made to blacks and at least 200 loans were made to whites in 2006. In the
analysis of Hispanic segregation, we include all Hispanic and non-Hispanic
white borrowers in metropolitan areas in which at least 200 loans were
made both to Hispanics and to non-Hispanic whites in 2006. Table 2
shows key characteristics in 2000 of the 213 and 218 metropolitan areas
from which our black-white and Hispanic-white sample were drawn, respectively.60 It is worth noting that levels of black-white segregation are
generally higher than levels of Hispanic-white segregation; the median
level of black-white segregation in our sample is 0.55, measured by the dissimilarity index, while the median level of Hispanic-white segregation is
just 0.41. In other words, within the MSAs in our sample, the median percentage of the black population who would have to move to another census
tract in order to achieve an equal distribution of blacks across census tracts

60. In Table 2, the information in each column describes the characteristics of the metropolitan statistical areas in the particular quartile of segregation. For instance, the second
row of the panel A presents the percentage of the population in all of the MSAs in each
quartile that is black. The third row presents an average of the median incomes of the
MSAs in each quartile. The column headings present the definitions of the four quartiles of
segregation in terms of ranges of values of the dissimilarity index.
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is 55%, while the median percentage of Hispanics who would need to move
in the Hispanic-white sample is 41%. Table 2 shows that the characteristics of the metropolitan areas appear to differ with segregation. The more
highly segregated metropolitan areas tend to be larger, to have higher incomes, and higher shares of minority residents. Thus, it is important for us
to control for these characteristics in our regressions to estimate the independent association of segregation with lending patterns.
Table 3 shows summary statistics for our sample of borrowers in the
black-white and Hispanic-white analyses.61 The sample sizes are quite
large.62 In the analysis of black-white segregation, we have over 4.3 million white borrowers and over 730,000 black borrowers. These include
borrowers receiving home purchase as well as refinance loans. In the
analysis of Hispanic-white segregation, we have 3.9 million white borrowers and over a million Hispanic borrowers. Several key differences
emerge. Black and Hispanic borrowers tend to have lower incomes and are
more likely to get high-cost loans as compared to white borrowers. Specifically, approximately half of the black and Hispanic borrowers in our
samples receive high-cost first lien home purchase loans, compared to approximately 16% of white borrowers. Black borrowers are also much more
likely to be single female applicants (41.7%, compared to 22.8% of white
borrowers), while Hispanic borrowers are more likely to be single male applicants (42.3%, compared to 29.7% of white borrowers).
2.

Neighborhood Racial Composition and Lending: The Case of New
York City

In our analysis of borrowers in New York City, we test whether borrowers are more likely to get high-cost loans in largely minority census tracts,
and whether this difference across neighborhoods is particularly pro-

61. In Table 3, the percentages in the columns are the percentage of the column population that has the characteristic of the according row. The figures for Median Loan Amount
and Median Applicant Income are the median dollar amounts of the borrowers included in
the column population.
62. The universe of loans in the raw HMDA data was narrowed for our analysis. First,
the original 13,970,183 loans were cleaned to include only home purchase or refinance
loans for conventional, one- to four-family, owner-occupied properties. Following this
process, an MSA code was attached to each loan (by the FIPS county and census tract
codes), resulting in the removal of observations missing geographic identifiers for either
county or tract (74,593 observations); observations located in Puerto Rico (59,308 observations); observations in New England missing tract identifiers (430); and all observations located outside of metropolitan areas (1,358,844). Two sample data sets were then created,
one including loans to blacks and whites, and one including loans to Hispanics and whites.
As noted, loans were only included if they were located in a metropolitan area in which at
least 200 loans were made to black or Hispanic borrowers in 2006.
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nounced for minority borrowers. Specifically, we estimate the following
regressions, similar to those above:
Log [Pi/(1-Pi)] = X’β + Z’γ + SHRBLACKQ’µ + SHRBLACKQ*BLACK’η
Log [Pi/(1-Pi)] = X’β + Z’γ + SHRHISPQ’µ + SHRHISPQ*HISP’η

Pi is the probability that borrower i receives a high-cost loan, X represents the matrix of individual-level variables, including race, income, gender, whether there is co-applicant on the loan, and the loan amount. Z
represents the matrix of census tract, or neighborhood-level, variables, including poverty rate, percentage of residents who are foreign born, percentage of adult residents with at least some college education, tract population,
and the share of housing units built prior to 1950. SHRBLACKQ and
SHRHISPQ represent groups of dummy variables indicating whether the
tract is in the second, third, or fourth highest quartile of neighborhoods,
with respect to the share of blacks and Hispanics, respectively. The matrix
of coefficients µ measures the association between neighborhood racial
composition and likelihood of getting a high-cost loan for white borrowers,
and the coefficient η measures the differential association for blacks or
Hispanics relative to whites. The first regression is estimated for black and
white borrowers. The second regression is estimated for Hispanic and
white borrowers. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering within a census tract.
The New York City data set includes only home purchase or refinance
loans for conventional, one- to four-family, owner-occupied properties in
New York City during 2004–2007. We restrict loans to those made in census tracts with populations greater than 200 and greater than zero housing
units. For the black-white sample, we additionally excluded loans in tracts
that had fewer than ten loans to black borrowers or fewer than ten loans to
white borrowers. For the Hispanic-non-Hispanic white sample, we excluded loans in tracts with fewer than ten loans to Hispanics or to nonHispanic whites. The boundaries used in this analysis are 1999 census
boundaries. All dollar amounts are adjusted to 2007 dollars.
Table 4 shows selected characteristics of the 733 census tracts defining
our black-white sample and the 1093 tracts defining our Hispanic-nonHispanic white sample. As shown, tracts with larger Hispanic proportions
tend to have higher poverty rates (25.5% below the poverty line), less educated residents (35.6% with at least some college education), and a greater
share of immigrants (43.7% foreign born). Interestingly, the poverty rate
does not always increase with the share of blacks in a census tract, in part
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because tracts with a moderate number of black residents also tend to have
a larger share of Hispanic residents.
Table 5 shows individual borrower and loan characteristics for all the
loans in our New York City samples. As in our analysis of MSA segregation, we used HMDA data for our analysis. Unlike our national analysis,
however, we pooled loans originated in New York City over a four-year
period, between 2004–2007, to create a larger sample of loans. While the
sample size is of course smaller than for the national analysis, it is still
quite large, with some 91,000 loans in the black-white sample and over
137,000 loans in the Hispanic-non-Hispanic white sample. As for individual level characteristics, borrowers in New York City in 2004–2007 were
somewhat less likely to get high-cost loans than borrowers in the country as
a whole were in 2006 (see Table 3). This difference may be due to the disparate time periods or to variations between lending patterns in New York
City and those in the country as a whole.
B.
1.

Results of Regressions

Metropolitan Area Segregation and Lending

The first column of Table 6 shows the simple, unadjusted association between segregation at the MSA-level and the likelihood of getting a highcost home purchase loan for whites and blacks. The second column shows
the association between segregation and the likelihood of getting a highcost loan, after controlling for metropolitan area characteristics other than
segregation. The third column shows the association, after controlling for
individual borrower attributes as well as other metropolitan area characteristics. The next three columns show these same regressions for refinance
mortgages.
None of the coefficients on the segregation variables are statistically significant, suggesting that for white borrowers, there is no association between the segregation level of the metropolitan area in which they live and
the likelihood that they will receive a high-cost home purchase loan.63 The
coefficients on the segregation variables that interact with the black race
dummy variable are, however, almost all statistically significant and positive, and larger for the variables indicating higher levels of segregation,
suggesting that black borrowers who live in more segregated metropolitan

63. The parameter estimates displayed in Tables 6 and 7 represent the logarithmic odds
of the event (receipt of a high-cost loan) occurring to an individual who has particular characteristics. Given the complicated nature of interpreting these coefficients directly, predicted probabilities are presented in Tables 8 and 9.
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areas are more likely to get high-cost loans. These relationships hold true
even when individual borrower characteristics and other metropolitan area
attributes are taken into account.
The pattern is generally similar for refinance loans, though the associations are somewhat weaker and only appear for the most segregated metropolitan areas. Specifically, the likelihood of white borrowers getting highcost refinance loans is not associated with the level of segregation in their
metropolitan areas, but black borrowers do appear to be more likely to get
high-cost refinance loans in highly segregated metropolitan areas.
We see a generally similar story for Hispanic borrowers. The results
from the Hispanic-non-Hispanic white regressions are presented in Table 7.
Once again, the probability of white borrowers receiving a high-cost loan is
not associated with the levels of Hispanic-white segregation and are
slightly less likely to receive a high-cost loan in the most segregated metropolitan areas. Meanwhile, Hispanic borrowers, like black borrowers, are
more likely to receive high-cost loans when they live in a metropolitan area
in which their group is more residentially segregated.
In summary, it appears that white borrowers are unaffected by levels of
either black-white or Hispanic-white segregation but that black and Hispanic borrowers in more segregated metropolitan areas are more likely to
receive high-cost loans than those is less segregated areas. Significantly,
the fact that segregation seems to matter for black and Hispanic borrowers
and not for white borrowers, suggests that our segregation variables are not
simply picking up some other characteristic of metropolitan area housing
markets that is associated with high-cost lending.
Table 8 shows the predicted probability of a typical borrower of a given
race getting a high-cost home purchase loan in metropolitan areas of different segregation levels. The table shows that segregation has a larger association with high-cost home purchase loans for blacks than for Hispanics.
In a metropolitan area with low black-white segregation, the predicted
probability of a black borrower getting a high-cost loan is 2.8 times higher
than for a white borrower, while in a metropolitan area with high blackwhite segregation, the predicted probability of a black borrower getting a
high-cost loan is 3.5 times higher than for a white borrower. Similarly, in a
metropolitan area with low Hispanic-non-Hispanic white segregation, the
predicted probability of a Hispanic borrower getting a high-cost loan is 2.8
times higher than for a white borrower, while in a metropolitan area with
high Hispanic-non-Hispanic white segregation, the predicted probability of
a Hispanic borrower getting a high-cost loan is 3.4 times higher than for a
white borrower. Interestingly, in the case of refinance loans, segregation
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appears to have a stronger association with the likelihood of getting a highcost loan for Hispanic borrowers than for black borrowers.
2.

Neighborhood Racial Composition and Lending: The Case of New
York City

Our national analysis gives us strong reason to believe that racial segregation at the MSA level is related to lending outcomes for minority borrowers. This would suggest that within metropolitan areas, minority borrowers are more likely to receive high-cost loans when they live in
neighborhoods with larger shares of minority residents, perhaps because of
differential access to bank branches or information networks or more explicit racial targeting by high-cost lenders.64 We therefore tested whether
racial composition of census tracts within New York City is linked to the
probability that a black or Hispanic borrower living there receives a highcost loan, and whether this association is different than for white borrowers. In the interest of brevity, we do not show the full regression results for
the New York City analysis. Instead, we simply show the predicted probability that a typical white borrower and a typical borrower of a given minority race or ethnicity will receive a high-cost loan in each quartile of census tracts arranged by their percentage of residents of that given race or
ethnicity. These are predicted probabilities calculated from regression coefficients, holding all characteristics at their mean value for a borrower of
the given race. We show results for home purchase loans only, but the results for refinance loans in our New York City analysis are highly similar.
The top panel of Table 9 shows that black and white borrowers are more
likely to get a high-cost loan when they are buying a home in a census tract
that has a high proportion of blacks. Blacks and whites, in other words,
appear to be at a mortgage-cost disadvantage by buying homes in neighborhoods with more black residents. Specifically, in census tracts in the bottom quartile of black representation, our results suggest that a white borrower with mean characteristics for white borrowers in our sample has a
5% chance of receiving a high-cost home purchase loan, while a white borrower with identical observable characteristics faces a 17% chance of receiving a high-cost home purchase loan in the tracts in the top quartile of
black representation. For the typical black borrower with mean characteristics of black borrowers in our sample, the likelihood of receiving a high64. Note that it is possible that all minority borrowers in a high-segregation metropolitan
area are disadvantaged by high levels of segregation, regardless of the racial composition of
their individual neighborhood, because they may have less freedom of residential choice
than minority households living in less segregated metropolitan areas or that they experience
more racial hostility.
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cost home purchase loan is 25% in the census tracts with the lowest shares
of black residents and 38% in the census tracts with the highest shares of
blacks. It is possible, however, that there are systematic, unobserved differences between the borrowers living in neighborhoods with more black
residents.65
A similar comparison of white and Hispanic borrowers in neighborhoods
arranged in quartiles by their percentage of Hispanic residents reveals quite
different results. As shown in the bottom panel of Table 9, the predicted
probability that a typical white borrower gets a high-cost loan does not vary
with the percentage of Hispanic residents in a tract. A typical Hispanic
borrower is actually less likely to get a high-cost loan in tracts with higher
proportions of Hispanic residents. There is little evidence here that highcost lenders are disproportionately operating in heavily Hispanic neighborhoods.
The results for Hispanics in the Hispanic-white sample of census tracts,
seemingly at odds with our findings from our MSA-level analysis, do not
tell the whole story, however. Unlike most metropolitan areas around the
country, New York City has relatively large proportions of both black and
Hispanic residents, and neighborhoods which have low Hispanic populations often still have large non-white populations (see Table 4).66 Thus, in
New York City, it may be more relevant to test for the association between
the likelihood of a borrower getting a high-cost loan and the share of nonwhites in a census tract. Table 10 presents the results from this analysis.
The bottom panel of Table 10 shows that as the share of the population that
is non-white increases, the probability that a Hispanic borrower with average, observable characteristics for Hispanics receives a high-cost loan also
increases.
CONCLUSION
In summary, we find strong evidence that residential segregation plays a
role in shaping lending patterns. First, across metropolitan areas in the
United States, we find that both black and Hispanic borrowers are more
likely to receive high-cost home purchase and refinance loans in the metropolitan areas in which their racial group is more segregated. The likelihood
that white borrowers will get a high-cost loan, however, is generally the
same, regardless of the segregation level of the metropolitan area, suggest-

65. This is less of a concern in the metropolitan area analysis because it is far less likely
that households will sort across metropolitan areas according to segregation levels.
66. As shown in Table 4, for instance, the percentage of blacks in low Hispanic tracts
was 28.4%, while the percentage of blacks in high-Hispanic tracts was 15.7%.
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ing that the level of segregation in an area is not simply picking up some
other attribute of a metropolitan area that is associated with high-cost lending. Minority borrowers appear to be uniquely disadvantaged by segregation, and consequently, racial disparities in the percentage of borrowers
who receive high-cost loans are significantly larger in more segregated
metropolitan areas. Racial segregation surely does not explain the full extent of racial disparities in high-cost lending. Even in metropolitan areas
with low levels of segregation, black and Hispanic borrowers are far more
likely to receive high-cost loans than white borrowers. But segregation appears to magnify differences.
As for whether the racial composition of a neighborhood is directly
linked to borrower outcomes, we find evidence that it is, at least in New
York City. As the percentage of minorities in the neighborhood increases,
whites, blacks, and Hispanics all have a higher probability of receiving
high-cost loans. Interestingly, however, the evidence suggests that the
relative difference between the probability that a white borrower will receive a high-cost loan and the probability that a black borrower will receive
such a loan does not differ markedly between neighborhoods with smaller
and larger proportions of minority residents.
While our results suggest that racial segregation may exacerbate racial
disparities in high-cost lending, our data cannot reveal why these associations exist. Our findings for New York City, however, are consistent with
mechanisms that depend on differences in access to credit markets by
neighborhood, such as access to bank branches, differences in social networks across neighborhoods, and racially discriminatory geographic targeting by high-cost lenders, which would impact residents of all races in these
neighborhoods. It appears that residents of neighborhoods with higher
shares of black residents are particularly disadvantaged. More research is
needed to understand why exactly minority borrowers are more likely to
get high-cost loans in more segregated areas and to understand the different
ways that concentrations of blacks and Hispanics in neighborhoods may affect lending patterns.

BEEN_CHRISTENSEN

2009]

4/21/2009 3:44:35 PM

HIGH COST OF SEGREGATION

385

APPENDIX
Table 1: Characteristics of HMDA Borrowers
National (2006)
White
% 1st Lien Home Purchase Loans that Are
17.7%
High-cost
% Refinance Loans that Are High-cost
25.5%
Median Loan Amount
$143,000
Number of Loans
5,726,468
N.Y. City (2004-2007)
% 1st Lien Home Purchase Loans that Are
High-cost
% Refinance Loans that Are High-cost
Median Loan Amount
Number of Loans

Black

Hispanic

53.3%

46.2%

51.7%
$132,000
780,654

38.6%
$170,000
1,133,720

White

Black

Hispanic

7.8%

40.8%

30.1%

17.5%
$292,000
127,974

37.3%
$276,000
70,308

29.5%
$288,000
44,051

Table 2: MSA Characteristics by Quartiles of Segregation, for HMDA Samples (2000)
Q2: Low/Mod. Q3: Mod./High
Q4: High Seg.
Black/White
Q1: Low Seg.
Seg.
Seg.
(.64<D<=.85)
Sample
(0<D<=.45)
(.45<D<=.55)
(.55<D<=.64)
Total Popula29,452,222
33,622,783
46,450,480
94,264,194
tion
% Black
8.86%
11.00%
13.64%
16.78%
Median
40,481
42,843
43,239
44,898
Household Income
Number of
54
53
53
53
MSAs
Hispanic/White
Sample
Population
% Hispanic
Median
Household Income
Number of
MSAs

Q1: Low Seg.
(0<D<=.33)

Q2: Low/Mod.
Seg.
(.33<D<=.41)

Q3: Mod./High
Seg.
(.41<D<=.50)

Q4: High Seg.
(.50<D<=.75)

30,173,948

31,834,895

57,644,166

86,469,988

5.79%

11.23%

15.43%

20.26%

40,664

42,129

42,746

49,146

55

54

55

54
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for HMDA Samples (2006)
Black/White Sample
White BorBlack Borrowers
rowers
% of 1st Lien Homepurchase
16.5%
53.2%
Loans that Are High-cost
% of Refinance Loans that Are
24.3%
51.4%
High-cost
Median Loan Amount
175,000
159,000
Median Applicant Income
79,000
65,000
% in Income Category 1
19.6%
29.7%
% in Income Category 2
42.2%
44.0%
% in Income Category 3
18.6%
14.3%
% in Income Category 4
14.8%
7.3%
% Missing/Unreported Income
4.3%
4.3%
% Co-Applicant
47.3%
26.6%
% Single Male
29.7%
31.4%
% Single Female
22.8%
41.7%
% Gender Missing
0.2%
0.4%
N
4,325,144
733,451

[Vol. XXXVI

Hispanic/White Sample
White BorHispanic
rowers
Borrowers
16.2%

46.8%

23.8%

38.4%

186,000
82,000
17.8%
42.1%
19.3%
15.9%
4.5%
47.3%
29.7%
22.9%
0.2%
3,904,704

216,000
78,000
18.8%
43.8%
19.9%
10.4%
6.6%
30.5%
42.3%
27.0%
0.2%
1,061,725
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Table 4: Neighborhood Characteristics by Quartiles of Minority Concentration, for HMDA
Samples, New York City (2000)
Low/Mod.
Mod./
Low % Black
% Black
High % Black
Black/White
High % Black
(0<%Black
Sample
(0.19<%Black
(0.56<%Black
(0.84<%Black)
≤0.19)
≤0.56)
≤0.84)
% Non46.0%
13.2%
6.9%
1.3%
Hispanic White
% Non8.7%
36.6%
71.4%
88.9%
Hispanic Black
% Hispanic
26.6%
39.2%
15.9%
5.8%
Poverty Rate
14.0%
25.8%
23.6%
19.6%
% Foreign
36.2%
32.6%
33.9%
36.2%
Born
% with at least
53.4%
40.6%
42.1%
43.1%
Some College
% Old Units
46.5%
50.3%
45.2%
52.4%
(built before
1950)
Number of
183
183
183
184
Census Tracts
Hispanic/White
Sample
% NonHispanic White
% NonHispanic Black
% Hispanic
Poverty Rate
% Foreign
Born
% with at least
Some College
% Old Units
(built before
1950)
Number of
Census Tracts

Low/Mod. %
Hispanic
(0.08<%Hispa
nic ≤0.17)

Mod./High %
Hispanic
(0.17<%Hispanic
≤0.33)

57.2%

47.8%

32.9%

15.0%

28.4%

24.9%

23.1%

15.7%

5.6%
9.4%

12.0%
13.5%

23.7%
17.1%

54.9%
25.5%

25.6%

33.7%

38.9%

43.7%

63.1%

54.5%

46.5%

35.6%

42.4%

46.6%

50.0%

55.6%

273

273

273

274

Low % Hispanic
(0<%Hispanic
≤0.08)

High % Hispanic
(0.33< %Hispanic)
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Table 5: Summary Statistics for HMDA Samples (New York City) (2004-2007)
Black/White Sample
Hispanic/White Sample
White BorBlack Bor- White
Hispanic
rowers
rowers
Borrowers Borrowers
% 1st Lien Home Purchase
11.1%
35.4%
7.0%
28.2%
Loans that Are High-cost
% Refinance Loans that Are
23.9%
33.8%
16.8%
28.8%
High-cost
Median Loan Amount
276,000
293,000
292,000
330,000
Median Applicant Income
95,000
86,000
104,000
97,000
% in Income Category 1
8.2%
9.6%
6.8%
7.4%
% in Income Category 2
42.7%
51.2%
37.2%
39.8%
% in Income Category 3
24.1%
24.4%
24.8%
30.7%
% in Income Category 4
19.2%
7.3%
25.1%
13.6%
% Missing/Unreported Income
5.0%
6.6%
5.5%
7.6%
% with Co-Applicant
33.8%
25.4%
39.3%
27.9%
% Single Male Applicant
37.2%
31.2%
34.3%
41.5%
% Single Female Applicant
28.7%
43.1%
26.1%
30.3%
% with Gender Missing
0.3%
0.3%
0.3%
0.3%
N
37,502
53,711
90,054
46,572
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Table 6: Regression Results for Black/White Sample for Dissimilarity Index, Modeling Probability of receiving a High-cost 1st Lien Home Purchase or Refinance Loan (2006)
1st Lien Home Purchase
MSA + InMSA condividual
No controls
a
trols
controlsb
Low/Mod.
Seg. (Q1)
Mod./High
Seg. (Q2)
High Seg.
(Q3)
Low/Mod.
Seg.
Black
Mod./High
Seg.
Black
High Seg.
Black
Black

Refinance
No controls

MSA controlsa

MSA + Individual
controlsb

0.032

-0.084

-0.114

0.020

-0.005

-0.021

-0.055

0.031

0.025

0.037

-0.048

-0.055

0.061

0.038

0.029

0.072

-0.033

-0.036

0.135

0.150

**

0.063

0.035

0.030
0.024

0.153

**

0.080
0.382

***

0.301

***

0.302

***

-0.098

0.042

0.468

***

0.420

***

0.142

0.212

***

0.173

**

1.242 *** 1.494 *** 1.401 *** 1.119 *** 1.083 *** 1.016 ***
Other
X
X
X
X
MSA
Variables
Other Indiv VariX
X
ables
N
2,154,042
2,154,042
2,154,042
2,904,553
2,904,553
2,904,553
*** Indicates 99% confidence level, ** indicates 95% confidence. MSA control variablesa include log of
the population, share black, and log of median household income, and dummy variables for the 9 census
regions. Individual variablesb include applicant income, loan amount, co-applicant status, and gender. Q2:
Dissimilarity index between 0.45 and 0.55; Q3: Dissimilarity index between 0.55 and 0.64; Q4: Dissimilarity index > 0.64.
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Table 7: Regression Results for Hispanic/White Sample for Dissimilarity Index, Modeling Probability of
Receiving a High-cost 1st Lien Home Purchase or Refinance Loan (2006)
1st Lien Home Purchase
MSA + InMSA condividual
No controls
a
trols
controlsb

Refinance
No controls

MSA controlsa

MSA + Individual
controlsb

Low/Mod.
-0.074
-0.091
-0.084
-0.077
-0.032
-0.029
Seg. (Q2)
Mod./High
0.035
0.074
0.074
-0.020
-0.028
-0.027
Seg. (Q3)
High Seg.
-0.167
-0.147
-0.134
-0.248 *** -0.161 **
-0.146 **
(Q4)
Low/Mod.
0.144
0.135
0.119
0.200
**
0.147
*** 0.135
***
Seg.
Hispanic
Mod./High
Seg.
0.079
0.060
0.034
0.158
**
0.208
*** 0.186
***
Hispanic
High Seg.
0.227
*** 0.260
*** 0.226
*** 0.273
*** 0.308
*** 0.274
***
Hispanic
Hispanic
1.376
*** 1.311
*** 1.197
*** 0.503
*** 0.548
*** 0.499
***
Other
MSA
X
X
X
X
Variables
Other InX
X
div Variables
N
2,132,593
2,132,593
2,132,593
2,833,836
2,833,836
2,833,836
*** Indicates 99% confidence level, ** indicates 95% confidence. MSA control variablesa include log of
the population, share black, and log of median household income, and dummy variables for the 9 census
regions. Individual variablesb include applicant income, loan amount, co-applicant status, and gender. Q2:
Dissimilarity index between 0.33 and 0.41; Q3: Dissimilarity index between 0.41 and 0.5; Q4: Dissimilarity
index > 0.5.
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Table 8: Predicted Probability of Getting a High-cost Home Purchase Loan for Typical Borrower of Given Race, by Segregation Level of Metropolitan Area—National Sample. All
borrower and metropolitan area characteristics were assumed to be at the mean for a borrower of that race, other than the segregation level of metropolitan area.

Q1: Low
Seg.

Segregation Level of MSA (quartiles)
Q2:
Q3: Mod/High Q4: High
Low/Mod.
Seg.
Seg.
Seg.

White

0.16

0.14

0.16

0.16

Black

0.45

0.46

0.53

0.56

0.29***

0.32***

0.37***

0.40***

White

0.16

0.15

0.17

0.14

Hispanic
Hispanic-White Difference

0.45

0.45

0.47

0.47

0.29***

0.30***

0.30***

0.33***

Black-White Difference

*** Indicates significance at a 99% confidence level
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Table 9: Predicted Probability of Getting a High-cost Home Purchase Loan for Typical
Borrower of Given Race, by Minority Concentration in Census Tract—New York City
Sample. All borrower and census tract characteristics were assumed to be at the mean for a
borrower of that race, other than the share of blacks or Hispanics in the census tract.
Black and Hispanic Concentration of Neighborhood (quartiles)
Q1: Low
Q2: Low/Mod
Q3: Mod/High
Q4: High Black
Black Conc.
Black Conc.
Black Conc.
Conc.
White
0.05
0.09
0.09
0.17
Black
Black-White
Diff.

White
Hispanic
HispanicWhite Diff.

0.25

0.31

0.31

0.38

0.20***

0.22***

0.21***

0.21***

Q1: Low Hispanic Conc.
0.05

Q2: Low/Mod
Hispanic Conc.
0.04

0.32

0.23

0.25

0.22

0.27***

0.19***

0.20***

0.18***

*** Indicates significance at a 99% confidence level

Q3: Mod/High
Hispanic Conc.
0.05

Q4: High Hispanic
Conc.
0.04

BEEN_CHRISTENSEN

2009]

4/21/2009 3:44:35 PM

HIGH COST OF SEGREGATION

393

Table 10: Predicted Probability of Getting a High-cost Home Purchase Loan for Typical
Borrower of Given Race, by Non-White Concentration in Census Tract—New York City
Sample. All borrower and census tract characteristics assumed to be at the mean for a borrower of that race, other than the share of blacks or Hispanics in the census tract.

Predicted Probabilities
White
Black
Black-White Difference

Q1: Low
Non-White
Conc.
0.05
0.24
0.19***

Q2: Low/Mod
Non-White
Conc.
0.11
0.30
0.19***

White
0.03
0.05
Hispanic
0.14
0.22
Hispanic-White Dif0.11***
0.17***
ference
*** Indicates significance at a 99% confidence level

Q3: Mod/High
Non-White
Conc.
0.11
0.34

Q4: High
Non-White
Conc.
0.18
0.38

0.23***

0.20***

0.11
0.28

0.16
0.31

0.18***

0.15***

